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A comparative analysis of managers’ perception of corrup-
tion in three post-transition economies based on the World 
Bank Enterprise Survey data in the 2002-2019 period has 
been provided in the paper. Results suggest that although 
the main forms of corruption seem to differ among the 
countries, within each country there does not seem to be 
any systematic change during the analysed period. While 
in Slovenia managers are most likely to acknowledge the 
existence of grand corruption, petty corruption seems to 
be more widespread in Croatia and Serbia according to the 
managers’ view. Those who perceive corruption to be high-
er are also the ones more likely to consider it an obstacle to 
their business endeavours. The difference is the highest in 
Croatia, suggesting that additional efforts in reducing cor-
ruption would probably be most welcomed by the business 
sector in that country.
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1. Introduction
Corruption is a well-researched topic, in particular within the transition 
economies perceived as having high levels of corruption, frequently at-
tributed to the legacy of the communist system (Sandholtz & Taagepera, 
2007; Borošak & Šumah, 2018) and the ill-managed privatisation process-
es (Aidis, Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2012). This paper is focused on corrup-
tion patterns in three post-transition1 economies that emerged from the 
same governing unit – Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia – thereby sharing the 
initial institutional framework at the beginning of the transition process. 
The evolution of the countries since has been very different,2 thus pro-
viding an interesting opportunity to discuss potentially different paths of 
corruption and its manifestations.
Corruption is notoriously difficult to assess because of its elusive nature. Re-
searchers consequently resort to analysing the perception of corruption, rath-
er than its concealed manifestations. Due to corruption variety, perception is 
most broadly assessed through a survey of a country’s citizens.3 The most nota-
ble indicator is the Corruption Perception Index.4 According to its latest issue 
1 Fink-Hafner and Thomas (1919) summarise different aspects of socioeconomic and 
political developments that result in different characteristics of the analysed countries.
2 The complexity of the transition process implied that the paths of individual coun-
tries from planned to market economies were widely different. In order to assess various 
aspects of transition, EBRD initiated a set of indicators in 1997 (https://www.ebrd.com/
what-we-do/economic-research-and-data/transition-impact/history). According to the six 
different indicators monitoring different aspects of transition, Croatia was close to the 
standards of a market economy in “small-scale privatisation” in 1993, “price liberalisation” 
in 1992 and “trade and foreign exchange systems” in 1994. Serbia reached the standards in 
“price liberalisation” in 2001, and “trade and foreign exchange systems” in 2009. Slovenia 
reached the standards in “small-scale privatisation” as well as “trade and foreign exchange 
system” in 1993, “price liberalisation” standards in 1998. 
3 I.e. Sekulić (2010) presents results of a survey for the year 2004 showing that 72% 
of Croatian citizens believed that most civil servants are involved in corruption.
4 The selected countries reach unfavourable positions also in other similar rankings; 
i.e. according to the World Bank Control of Corruption indicator (https://databank.world-
bank.org/databases/control-of-corruption), Slovenia’s percentile rank for the year 2018 was 
80.7, Croatia’s 60.1 and Serbia’s 41.8. According to the latest data from the Global Corrup-
tion Barometer (Global Corruption Barometer 2017 – Transparency.org), 22% of Serbian 
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published for the year 2019,5 Slovenia had the least corruption (ranked 35th 
in the world), followed by Croatia (ranked 63rd) and Serbia (ranked 91st). 
Their relative position remained more or less the same throughout 2012-
2019, even though some other countries in the region did change their rel-
ative positions.6 Previous studies based on different corruption indicators 
also portray similar relations between the countries. Wallace and Latche-
va (2006) found among the analysed economies in Central and Eastern 
Europe the highest prevalence of black economy in Serbia and Croatia. 
Perlić (2016) focuses on comparing Serbia and Croatia through various 
corruption indicators and finds the two countries similar in many aspects. 
In the present analysis, the focus is on corruption as an impediment to 
economic growth,7 thus we are primarily interested in the perspective of 
firm managers.8 Contrary to the research focusing on aggregate corrup-
tion indicators, the emphasis in the present analysis is on different forms 
of corruption. Specifically, the main question is whether the managers’ 
perceptions on average differ between the analysed countries when it 
comes to grand and petty corruption. The former is assessed by the per-
ception of corruption on different levels of government, while the latter 
by the perception of corruption at the level of an administrative agency 
or service: tax and customs, business licenses, inspections, utility connec-
tions, courts or public education and health facilities. Additionally, differ-
ent factors contributing to the probability that a firm will engage in petty 
corruption are explored across the countries. The paper seeks to explore 
citizens reported paying a bribe when accessing public services in the last 12 months, 10% of 
Croatian and 3% of Slovenian citizens. The Coppedge et al. (2020) Varieties of Democracy 
Project provides an extensive list of indicators. According to the political corruption index, 
Croatia’s score in 2019 was 32.1, Serbia’s 70.6 and Slovenia’s 26.1. At the same time, the 
public corruption index for Croatia was 40.1, Serbia’s 62.9 and Slovenia’s 11.5. Although 
different measures of corruption frequently come under severe criticism, this shows that 
they do, as also argued by Charron (2016), provide similar evidence. 
5 More at https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019
6 I.e. during the same period Bosnia and Herzegovina recorded a significant worsen-
ing of the relative position, while the Czech Republic recorded a significant improvement.
7 Although corruption has been considered as an important obstacle to doing busi-
ness, on an aggregated level there is no perfect correlation between doing business and 
corruption indicators. Indeed, the World Bank’s Doing Business aggregated indicator 
benchmarked for May 2019 Croatia ranked 51st, Serbia 44th and Slovenia 37th (https://
www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings). This suggests that microeconomic evidence based on 
firm-level data is necessary. 
8 Investigating managers’ perception relies on Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), who sug-
gest that when managers align organisational properties with the properties of their business 
environment, they are able to secure better firm performance.
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in a comparative analysis the contribution of different forms of corruption 
as perceived by the business sector.
The paper adopts the following structure. The next section briefly discuss-
es relevant literature. Section three discusses the data and methodology 
applied in the analysis presented in section four. The last section offers 
conclusions.
2. Literature Review
Although corruption is widely publicly discussed, there is little agreement 
in the literature on its adequate definition. The most frequently used 
seems to be the broad definition offered by the World Bank, envisaging 
corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain (World Bank, 
1997). Due to its elusive nature, measuring corruption also attracted sig-
nificant attention among researchers (Ledeneva, Bratu & Köker, 2017). 
Knack (2007) analyses a plethora of surveys created with the intention of 
measuring corruption, and states that no single corruption measure and 
no single data source on corruption is most appropriate for all purposes. 
Heywood (2015) suggests that since the 1990s the dominant mode of 
measurement has been based on perception, i.e. based on the respond-
ents’ perception aggregated indices are created, including the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI), Bribe Payers Index (BPI), Global Corruption 
Barometer, Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys 
(BEEPS), and the Control of Corruption element in the World Bank 
Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). A detailed critique of 
the most widely used corruption indicators is offered by Chabova (2017), 
who concludes that a combination of aggregate corruption indicators is 
preferable on the country level, while opinion polls are preferable for mi-
croanalysis. In addition to methodological concerns related to aggregate 
corruption indices, the specific wording of the survey questions related to 
corruption also deserved attention in the literature (Nur-tegin & Jakee, 
2020; Gutmann, Padovano & Voigt, 2019; Chabova, 2017). The differ-
ences occur because of different scopes of social norms across countries, 
the reluctance of respondents to admit to participating in corruption in 
experience-formed questions, and the biases in the perception of corrup-
tion activities among those who participate in corruptive behaviour (Cu-
ervo-Cazurra, 2016). Gamberoni and his colleagues (2016) suggest that 
by avoiding direct questioning, careful implementation of adequate inter-
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viewing techniques and an accurate design of survey questions can lead 
to more accurate reporting of corruption practices by survey respondents. 
Regardless of the methodological obstacles related to measuring corrup-
tion, it remains an important policy issue (Heywood, 2015). The impor-
tance of studying corruption stems from the notion that it has a negative 
impact on economic growth (Mauro, 1995), and decreases the quality of 
the public sector, as it leads to the loss of public trust and belief in the 
political system (Karklins, 2005). In general, corruption has a negative9 
impact on the citizens’ life satisfaction (Helliwell, 2006), and the poten-
tial to subsequently lead to civil unrest (Brown, Touchton & Whitford, 
2011; Pellegata, 2012). 
Varieties of corruption have been categorised into two main types (Elliot, 
1997). Low-scale or petty corruption includes a single act of payment in 
order to gain access to a specific government service. A classic example is 
bribing local officials in order to receive a specific licence (more quickly). 
This type of corruption is highly visible to the wider public, because the 
amount of bribery is usually not set prohibitively high and a large propor-
tion of the population gets in contact with such practices – not only firms, 
but also citizens who require certain licences or are subject to some forms 
of inspection. Due to this widespread occurrence, the citizens become 
accustomed to administrative corruption to the point that it is sometimes 
argued that “corruption greases the wheel of the economy” (Krammer, 
2013). The second type is called grand-scale corruption, taking the form 
of seizing the law-creating process or doing business via political links in 
the government (Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann, 2002). This form, also 
known as “state-capture”, is usually less visible, but the associated typical 
financial scores are usually higher. It is observed on relatively rare occa-
sions, revealed as government officials’ “scandals” frequently within the 
scope of political opponents’ campaigns during the elections. Such events 
usually cause spikes in the citizens’ perception of the corruption level, but 
their impact on corruption awareness is usually not long-lasting.10
9 There is also abundant literature claiming that corruption is beneficial for economic 
growth, starting from the seminal contributions of Huntington (1968) and Leff (1964). 
Recent contributions to greasing the wheels include: Bologna and Ross (2015), Dreher and 
Gassebner (2013), Williams, Martinez-Perez and Kedir (2016). Recent empirical evidence 
suggests that although some forms of corruption seem to be beneficial to enterprises, there 
is more evidence in favour of the “sanding the wheels” of economy hypothesis (Nur-tegin 
& Jakee, 2020).
10 Potrafke (2019) documents an increase in corruption perception in pre-election 
years.
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Even though corruption is a worldwide phenomenon, it has received spe-
cial attention in transition economies. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue 
that during the post-communist era, government agents started to act 
more independently in comparison to a one-party system, and this con-
tributed to the spread of corruption. Schneider and Enste (2000) show 
that rising corruption was correlated with the informalisation of large sec-
tors of the economy and non-transparent privatisation (Godoy & Stiglitz, 
2007); this in turn created increased tax pressure, which subsequently 
spurred more tax evasion, thus leading to the creation of the vicious circle 
of corruption. The large and inefficient public sector grew, compelling 
private agents to grease the wheels of public administration in order to 
make it more efficient. Moreover, some scholars have argued that the 
corrupt masses democratically generated new corrupt elites, even when 
the former communist elites were out of the political arena (Sandholtz & 
Taagepera, 2007). 
The open question remains whether these corruption-enabling processes 
maintained their influence in the post-transition period. One of the coun-
teracting actions was attributed to the European Union accession process, 
as one of the important steps was the ability to ensure good governance 
conditions. Grubiša (2010) explains how efforts to reduce corruption were 
related to the EU accession and suggests that among all new Member 
States, Slovenia had one of the lowest corruption incidences, while Cro-
atian problems with corruption were judged to be serious by EU officials 
during the accession phase (Bejaković, 2017). Serbia still remains on its EU 
accession path and the effects of the process are not so pronounced as in 
the other two economies, although corruption is one of the topics closely 
monitored (Bogojević & Skakavac, 2018). There is no guarantee, though, 
that EU membership itself acts as a counter-corruption measure.
Although corruption has many aspects, its detrimental economic effects 
are not often studied on the microeconomic level (Ullah, 2020). Firms 
in corrupt environments frequently engage in such activities, adopting 
them as a “business as usual” practice (Anand, Ashforr & Joshi, 2005). In 
a commercial setting where corruption is commonplace, managers may 
conclude that such practices are ordinary or even necessary for the op-
eration of the firm (Collins, Uhlenbruck, & Rodriguez, 2009). This can 
even contribute to the routinisation of corruptive practices within firms 
(Vaughan, 1999).
Scholars have not reached conclusions on the impact of such practices 
on the firm level. On the one hand, corruption requires at least two types 
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of additional costs – the amount of informal payment and the time re-
quired for dealing with corrupt government officials (Kaufmann, 1997; 
Svensson, 2005). On the other hand, individual companies may be able 
to benefit from getting government contracts (Cheung, Rau & Stouraitis, 
2012). Thus, managers can rationalise corruption as another source of 
competitive advantage or as a mechanism for reducing transaction costs 
in countries with high levels of regulation. 
It has also been found that not all firms are prone to bribery. Svensson 
(2003) and Fisman and Svensson (2007) stress that bribery practices are 
industry- and region-specific, while other studies implicate that bribery 
is related to the firms’ size (Safavian, Graham & Gonzalez-Vega, 2001; 
Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt & Levine, 2006), ownership, market orientation, 
and capabilities (Luo & Han, 2009). Some even argue that the differences 
in the bribes paid by firms depend not only on their ability to pay a bribe, 
but also on their ability to refuse the payment of a bribe (Svensson, 2003). 
Specific attention in the literature has also been devoted to the role of 
multinational enterprises (MNE). Initially, stronger inclusion of MNEs 
in the economic landscapes of transition economies was advocated, be-
cause of a rather naive belief that they would transfer their best manage-
ment practices. But, as Sundaram and Black (1992) suggest, politics is 
an essential area for international business, so it was soon revealed that 
MNEs have diverse practices accommodating local business conditions in 
order to enhance their own competitive positions (Moran, 2006). Since 
foreign direct investments have been propagated throughout transition 
economies, and in particular in South-Eastern Europe (Apostolov, 2016), 
as a major capital11 attraction policy, potential differences in corruption 
perceptions between foreign and domestic managers are interesting.
There is relatively little comparative evidence on corruption for the 
post-transition countries in the region. Existing studies are usually fo-
cused either on providing global conclusions supposed to be valid for a 
larger group of countries (Gamberoni et al., 2016; Blagojević & Damijan, 
2013; Habiyaremye & Raymond, 2018), or on an individual country in-
depth perspective. Previous studies have focused on the overall corrup-
tion effects and different forms of corruption have not been explored. 
In addition to providing a comparative analysis of corruption varieties in 
three neighbouring countries, the main contribution of the paper is in the 
attempt to provide an evolutionary perspective across a period of almost 
11 Firms exposed to corruption are also financially constrained (Ullah, 2020).
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two decades. Since the focus is on managers’ perspectives, the results are 
important from the point of view of competitiveness of the analysed econ-
omies. Additionally, the comparative in-depth analysis of the most recent 
data provides an opportunity to offer policy recommendations.
3. Data and Methodology 
In order to be able to adopt a comparative approach, the World Bank En-
terprise Survey data have been used12 due to their relatively large coverage 
of corruption-related questions13 comparable across the countries in the 
sample. The Survey itself has evolved through waves, thus the question-
naire and some of the variables subsequently used in the analysis are not 
directly comparable through time. In order to maintain comparability, the 
presentation of the results is governed by the largest possible intersection 
of the dataset. First of all, the results are restricted to the waves of 2002, 
2005, 2013 and 2019. This representation also allows for a discussion 
on the possible impact of the global economy’s financial crisis14 on the 
results, because the first two waves clearly present the pre-crisis period, 
while the waves of 2013 and 2019 represent the post-crisis period. 
To address the issue of grand corruption, the incidence of informal pay-
ment to government officials is analysed.15 Corruption on three levels of 
12 Individual firm level data are available for download at https://www.enterprisesur-
veys.org/. The Survey, also referred to as the Business Environment and Enterprise Per-
formance Survey (BEEPS), has evolved through different waves, for the years 1999, 2002, 
2005, 2007, 2009, 2012 and 2019. The website, along with the data, contains all question-
naires and sample information data. Respondents of the Survey are business owners and top 
managers, in order to impose accountability of the answers provided. Not all the countries 
were included in all the waves, and the 2019 Survey results are not yet available for all par-
ticipating countries. The number of firms participating in the analysed countries is presented 
in Appendix Table A1. 
13 Knack (2007) argues that one of the advantages of the BEEPS for measuring cor-
ruption is that it enables exploring different forms across various functions of government.
14 Studies have shown that the managers’ perceptions of their firms’ financial con-
straints influence the decision to bribe (Martin et al., 2007). Due to the large financial con-
straints on the financial markets during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, in particular 
for post-transition economies whose financial systems are judged as particularly vulnerable, 
this point is important to explore.
15 The question asks about the respondent’s general acquaintance with such activi-
ties – “it is often said that firms make gifts or informal payments to public officials to gain 
advantages in the drafting of laws, decrees, regulations or other binding government deci-
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government has been addressed through payments, gifts or exchange of 
favours with:
– parliamentarians to affect their votes, 
– national government officials to affect the content of government de-
crees, 
– local or regional government officials to affect their votes or the con-
tent of local or regional decrees. 
Next, the size and form of informal payments, as well as the firm’s ties to 
the government sector, have been assessed. The assumption of the latter 
is that the firms regularly doing business with the government sector are 
more in a position to observe typical behaviour of government officials 
and/or participate themselves in informal payments. In case of a corrupt 
environment, the efficiency of public administration is also lower. The 
questionnaire, however, did not maintain the same focus on informal pay-
ment occurrence in the pre-crisis and post-crisis period. In the pre-crisis 
period, the focus was on capturing the size of the informal sector in tran-
sition economies, still perceived to largely govern economic affairs. With 
regard to the issue of whether firms have stronger links with the govern-
ment sector, there are two variables:
– In the pre-crisis period, the question was: “What percentage of your do-
mestic sales are to the government or government agencies (excluding 
state-owned enterprises)?” For the empirical analysis, a dummy variable 
has been created that takes value 1 if the percentage is larger than zero.
– In the post-crisis period, the question was: “Over the last year, has 
this establishment secured or attempted to secure a government con-
tract?” In this case a dummy variable has been created that takes 
value 1 if the respondents provided a positive answer to the question.
Next, the question on the typical amount paid to the government for 
securing a contract was explored. The average values of respondents who 
reported a positive value for the corresponding survey question16 is pro-
vided in the empirical section. 
sions”. Respondents were asked whether such practices have a direct impact on their firm by 
using a scale from 1 (no impact) to 5 (very major impact), and the options are not mutually 
exclusive. A dummy variable has been created that takes value 1 if the respondent estimated 
major or very major impact.
16 “When firms in your industry do business with the government, how much of the 
contract value would be typically paid in additional or unofficial payments/gifts to secure 
the contract?”
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Petty corruption is captured through the investigation of the forms of 
activities, where the respondents reported either perceiving or experienc-
ing informal payments. In the pre-crisis period, it was assumed that firms 
would be reluctant to answer directly to the question on informal practic-
es if they themselves had been engaged in such activities. So, the question 
was formed indirectly.17 
In the post-crisis period, it is possible to directly explore if the firms have 
engaged in certain activities and whether they expected or requested for 
a counter service in that case.18 The literature claims that there are im-
portant differences between the perceived and experienced corruption 
(Gutmann, Padovano & Voigt, 2019), so the answers are not comparable 
to the pre-crisis period even though they refer to similar activities. It is 
assumed that the respondents with direct corruption experience tend to 
perceive corruption to be higher in general, than the respondents who did 
not have personal experience with corruptive behaviour (Charron, 2016).
Another important question is whether there are differences between do-
mestically owned firms and those with at least some foreign capital in the 
ownership structure. Although foreign management practices have been 
frequently advocated as important for the future development of firms in 
transition (Fu, 2012), the literature also suggests that multinational cor-
porations engage in bribing local officials, thus taking advantage of looser 
governance standards in the countries where anti-corruption laws are less 
likely to be enforced than in their home markets (Moran, 2006). Indeed, 
some studies have found that foreign firms are almost twice as likely to be 
engaged in grand corruption as domestic firms (Hellman, Jones & Kauf-
mann, 2002). 
In order to gain deeper insight, an investigation was carried out into the 
differences in the factors contributing to a firm’s probability to engage in 
petty corruption. Since the dependent variable is a binary variable tak-
ing value 1 if a manager reported participation in any form of petty cor-
ruption during the year 2019, estimates were performed using the probit 
model. The choice of independent variables was guided by the literature. 
17 “Thinking now of unofficial payments/gifts that a firm like yours would make in 
a given year, could you please tell me how often would they make payments/gifts for the 
following purposes ... ?” Since the respondents could answer on a 6-point Likert scale (rang-
ing from 1-never to 6-always), a dummy variable has been created that takes value 1 if the 
answer was 5-usually or 6-always.
18 Specifically, respondents were asked whether an informal gift or payment was ex-
pected or requested in relation to a specific activity.
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Personal characteristics of the manager19 were considered: gender (Ha-
nousek, Shamshur & Trel, 2019) and experience (Collins, Uhlenbruck & 
Rodriguez, 2009). Firm characteristics include age (Collins, Uhlenbruck 
& Rodriguez, 2009), the owners’ gender (Wellalage, Locke & Samujh, 
2019), size (Safavian, Graham & Gonzalez-Vega, 2001; Beck, Demirgüc-
Kunt & Levine, 2006), sector (Svensson, 2003), ownership (Luo & Han, 
2009; Moran, 2006), whether the firm is an innovator (Habiyaremye & 
Raymond, 2018), or exporter (de Jong & Bohmans, 2011). Variables de-
picting enabling corruption situations include: time dealing with govern-
ment officials (Svensson, 2005), whether a person from the firm’s gov-
erning structures has been elected or appointed to a political position 
(Collins, Uhlenbruck & Rodriguez, 2009), whether the firm has a gov-
ernment contract (Cheung, Rau & Stouraitis, 2012), and whether it com-
petes against informal competitors (Iriyama, Kishore & Talukdar, 2016). 
The estimates were performed for each country separately, but following 
the same procedure. 
Figure 1: Estimation strategy representation
Source: Author’s representation.
19 Literature also recognises some other personal characteristics that might influence 
the probability of participating in corruptive activity; i.e., Mocan (2008) lists age, marital 
status, labour market activity, wealth, education, gender, and the location of the residence 
of the individual. However, such data on respondents are not available in the Enterprise 
Survey.
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Based on the definition of variables presented in this section, the next 
section provides comparative evidence for Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia.
4. Results and Discussion
The analysis starts with examining the relationship between firms and the 
government sector, with a focus on the role of foreign firms. Differences 
in perceptions of corruption between the managers of firms which are 
completely domestically owned and those that have at least a certain per-
centage of foreign ownership are presented in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Percentage of firms doing business with the government
Source: Author based on the BEEPS dataset, various waves.
The data clearly document that firms in analysed countries to a large ex-
tent have a business relationship with the government. This is not only the 
case for firms in 100% domestic ownership, where the assumption of ori-
entation towards the domestic market can seem more plausible. Indeed, 
it can be noticed that in Croatia, firms with foreign ownership in 2019 
were more likely to secure a government contract than purely domestical-
ly owned firms. This implies a still strong influence of the public sector in 
the economy and puts the firms in a position to bribe. In view of the fact 
that the questions had changed between 2005 and 2013, all the analysed 
periods cannot be directly compared. However, it does seem that activi-
ties with the government sector were increasing in the pre-crisis period in 
all the countries and for almost all firm types, with the only exception of 
the firms with a foreign ownership share in Serbia. After the crisis, howev-
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er, business activities with the government sector decreased for Croatian 
firms and foreign-owned firms in Slovenia. On the contrary, they slightly 
increased for the domestic firms in Slovenia and very strongly increased 
for all firms in Serbia.20 While dealing with the government puts firms in 
a position to observe informal practices, it also puts them in a position to 
assess the extent of the informal payment when dealing with the govern-
ment sector, which is depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Perceived percentage of contract value in the form of informal payment
Source: Author based on the BEEPS dataset, various waves.
Here the respondents were asked to report the typical value of informal 
payment in their line of business, not their personal experience. It is be-
lieved that such answers are more likely to be accurate, as respondents 
might be reluctant to self-report illegal activities. Also, the data in Figure 
3 present the averages of provided positive answers,21 as it is believed that 
those respondents did have some information to share in comparison to 
those who reported zero values or did not respond to the question. Due 
to this approach, the number of answers is relatively small and the average 
is under the strong influence of outliers. Nevertheless, some insight can 
be gained. It can be noticed that in all the countries foreign firms did not 
provide information for the year 2019, and in Croatia also for 2013. This 
does not necessarily imply that they are not aware of any informal pay-
20 Ivanović-Djukić and colleagues (2019), based on a survey covering 250 Serbian 
entrepreneurs in 2015, suggest that 60% resorted to some form of corruption activity when 
starting their business.
21 The range of provided answers to this specific question is provided in Appendix 
Table A2. 
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ment, but that they may have simply decided not to share the information. 
It is also interesting to note that the estimated percentages by domestic 
firms in Croatia and Serbia were fairly similar in the pre-crisis period, and 
it also seems that in 2013 domestic firms in Croatia and Slovenia shared 
impressions of the size of the informal payment necessary to secure a gov-
ernment contract. Such cross-country similarities suggest that respondents 
are more likely to accurately assess the value (approximately 5-8% of the 
contract value). However, in general there does not seem to be any system-
atic trend in the decrease or increase of the informal payments related to 
ensuring a government contract for domestic or foreign firms.
We turn attention to the question of whether those who obtain a govern-
ment contract perceive corruption to be a higher obstacle to their busi-
ness activity. The data in Figure 4 provide expected results – those who 
do business with the government believe that corruption is a more serious 
problem for their firm; the difference is the highest in Croatia, followed 
by Slovenia, while in Serbia the difference is relatively small.22 Such results 
imply that additional efforts in reducing corruption would probably be 
most welcomed by the business sector in Croatia.
Figure 4: Corruption as an obstacle to business activity if having a contract 
with the public sector, 2019
Source: Author based on BEEPS 2019.
22 This could be related to the argument that corruption is systematic in Serbia and 
“bribery has become a necessary condition for even the smallest business enterprise” (Bjela-
lac & Bingulac, 2016, p. 212).
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The subsequent analysis is devoted to exploring the differences in the 
forms of petty corruption across the countries. Similar to the overall cit-
izens’ corruption perception depicted through the Corruption Percep-
tion Index, the managers’ perception reveals that Serbia had the highest 
perceived corruption incidence, while Slovenia the lowest (Figure 5). In 
2002, managers in Croatia and Serbia perceived that the highest likeli-
hood of corruption was related to obtaining a government contract, while 
those in Slovenia perceived that it was related to obtaining a business 
licence. In 2005, Serbian and Slovenian managers maintained their opin-
ion, although Slovenian managers attributed a similar likelihood also to 
the activities related to buildings and environmental inspections, as well 
as the legislative process. The latter also attracted attention of Croatian 
managers as being the most likely candidate for corruptive activities in 
2005.
Figure 5: Cross-country comparison of informal payment in different economic 
activities, pre-crisis period
Source: Author based on the BEEPS dataset, various waves.
In the period after the crisis it can be observed whether firms encountered 
corruptive practices. These results are presented in Figure 6 and reveal 
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the answers of those respondents who participated in a certain activity 
where informal practices occur.23 Here the data also show that Serbia 
has the highest perception of the prevalence of informal payments, while 
Slovenia the lowest. In case of Serbia,24 in 2013 the construction sector 
was the most affected, while in 2019 import licensing took the lead. In 
case of Croatia,25 obtaining operating licences seems to be the activity 
where firm managers reported the highest incidence of informal payment. 
The relatively high occurrence of informal payments related to the water 
sector might be surprising for Slovenia in 2013, and it was not sustained 
in 2019, when receiving an operating licence became the major activity, 
followed by obtaining a connection to the electricity grid. It has to be 
borne in mind that some of the services reported here (such as water or 
electricity) are still to a large extent provided by state-owned enterprises, 
although to a different extent in the analysed countries due to the differ-
ent stages of the market liberalisation process. However, certain services 
are directly related to the activities of the public officials, and subsequent-
ly these results show that in all three countries corruption was still present 
at least in some form.
In order to gain more insight into the factors contributing to the per-
sistence of petty corruption, we estimated a probit model with the de-
pendent variable taking value 1 if a firm participated in any of the above 
mentioned forms of petty corruption in 2019.26 The marginal effects of 
probit estimates are presented in Table 1, while probit estimates are given 
in Table A3 in the Appendix.
23 I.e., the data includes the respondent’s experience of informal payment for elec-
tricity connection only if that respondent applied for a connection to the electricity grid. 
24 Ivanović-Djukić and colleagues (2019) suggest that petty corruption (mostly tak-
ing different forms of bribery) is widespread in Serbia. They specifically suggest corruption 
related to obtaining permits for building construction and obtaining an electricity connec-
tion when starting a new business.
25 Glavinja, Cerić and Nahod (2017) focus on the construction sector in Croatia and 
report that 90% of their 107 survey respondents believe that corruption in the construction 
sector is very frequent. Respondents also believe that the pre-qualification and tendering 
phase and the construction project execution phase are most susceptible to corruption. Fur-
thermore, 76.9% of respondents did not report any changes in dealing with corruption since 
EU accession. 
26 For that year, 14.85% of respondents in Croatia reported participating in at least 
one of the petty corruption activities, 6.37% of respondents in Serbia, and 0.97% of respond-
ents in Slovenia.
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Figure 6: Cross-country comparison of informal payment in different economic 
activities, post-crisis period
Source: Author based on BEEPS dataset, various waves.
Table 1: Probability of a firm engaging in petty corruption, marginal effects, 2019











































































































Observations 220 296 146
Pseudo R2 0.335 0.0971 0.183
Source: Author’s estimates based on BEEPS 2019.
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** denotes significance 
at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean 
of the sample data. The marginal effect of the specific variable is expressed 
as percentage point change from this level of the predicted probability of 
engaging in petty corruption at the mean of the data. For dummy varia-
bles, the marginal effect represents the change in the probability of petty 
corruption for firms with and without that characteristic, holding other 
characteristics constant at the same time.
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Estimates have identified relatively few significant predictors for firms to 
engage in petty corruption. In case of Croatia, a significant predictor for a 
firm to engage in petty corruption is if the owner, CEO, top manager, or 
any of the board members of the firm have ever been elected or appoint-
ed to a political position. This shows that political ties in Croatia persist 
in maintaining the corruptive environment, which is an important result. 
This result is particularly striking since the fully state-owned enterprises27 
are not included in the BEEPS survey. The importance of political con-
nections for a business activity is probably even more widespread than it 
is possible to document with the data. In case of Serbia, both small and 
large firms are more likely to engage in petty corruption than medium-size 
firms. Also in case of Serbia, the wholesale sector seems to be more prone 
to petty corruption than the manufacturing sector.
Finally, we explore whether those who experienced a form of petty cor-
ruption are more or less prone to claim that corruption creates an impor-
tant obstacle to their business. The results are presented in Figure 7. In 
Croatia and Serbia, the situation is similar to the case when an enterprise 
had a government contract (Figure 4): those who did have experience 
with petty corruption are more likely to claim that corruption creates an 
important obstacle to their business activity. The difference is once again 
the largest in Croatia, implying that the business community in Croatia is 
most likely to welcome attempts to reduce corruption. Interestingly, the 
same findings have not been confirmed for Slovenia. Such a result is prob-
ably related to the relatively small occurrence of petty corruption forms 
in Slovenia (Figure 6): since corruption already is at relatively low levels, 
the business community in general does not perceive it to be an important 
obstacle to their activities. 
27 Recent newspaper headlines in Croatia report of an ongoing investigation involv-
ing a state-owned enterprise director, a city mayor and an entrepreneur as the main actors in 
possible corruption related to public procurement. More at https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/cla-
nak/policija-privela-predsjednika-uprave-janafa-i-gradonacelnika-velike-gorice-20200917. 
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Figure 7: Corruption as an obstacle to business activity if experiencing petty 
corruption, 2019
Source: Author based on BEEPS 2019.
This overview has suggested that regardless of the overall size of the in-
formal sector in the analysed countries, from the policy perspective it is 
of utmost importance to track the most recent forms of petty corruption 
in order to be able to design specific policy measures to counteract such 
activities. It is clearly evident that the predominant activities in which pet-
ty corruption is perceived by the business sector change through time. 
Another important reason can be found in previous studies. Habiyaremye 
and Raymond (2018) analyse the grand and petty corruption’s different 
impact on innovation in the transition economies of Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia. They somewhat surprisingly find that petty corruption of for-
eign firms tends to foster major innovations. On the contrary, domestic 
firms’ involvement in petty corruption appears to be detrimental to invest-
ment in research and development and introduction of improved products 
and services, but not to major innovation. This shows that the perception 
of corruption plays a significant role in reducing innovation and subse-
quently economic growth. Thus, petty corruption should not be consid-
ered as business as usual necessary to grease the wheels of the economy, 
but rather every effort should be made to encourage its reduction.
Finally, the differences in grand corruption varieties are presented across 
three analysed countries in the year 2019. The data in Figure 8 show that 
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Croatia has the lowest perceived grand corruption.28 Contrary to expec-
tations, Slovenia is the country with the highest perceived grand corrup-
tion. So, even though the general perception of corruption in Slovenia is 
relatively low, as well as the petty corruption perceived by the business 
sector, corruption at the highest levels of government suggests a different 
picture. This is somewhat contrary to the results presented by Wadsworth, 
Wheat and Swartz (2012), who provide a comparative analysis based on 
the same Survey (BEEPS) for the years 2002 and 2005, and suggest that 
firms in Slovenia perceive the lowest impact on their business from unof-
ficial payments or other benefits to parliamentarians to affect their votes. 
The findings presented here are more in line with Borošak and Šumah’s 
(2018) argument that “white-collar corruption” has been increasing in 
Slovenia in the more recent period. 
One of the reasons for such potentially contradictory results is that a rel-
atively small share of respondents answer this question. However, this 
does not mean that we can discard the findings easily. The relatively small 
percentages of firms reporting corruption do not necessarily mean that 
the extent of corruption is also small. It could be the case that relatively 
few enterprises have access to government officials and/or large influence 
on public officials. As discussed earlier, grand corruption is relatively less 
visible to the wider public. It might also be the case that the sample was 
not able to capture the most relevant firms to disclose these practices 
in all the countries, and it could also be the case that the managers who 
participated in the Survey decided to respond strategically. An interesting 
study by Popova and Post (2018) relies on the comparison of indictments 
of ministers for the act of corruption and actually did not find evidence 
that EU membership, existence of specialised anti-corruption prosecu-
tion or a more independent judiciary raises the profile of grand corrup-
tion. According to their findings, Croatia29 took the middle position in 
indicting its ministers during the 2000–2012 period, but had a relatively 
high conviction rate.
28 According to the Balkan Barometer for the year 2015, the population in Croatia to 
a larger extent than the population in Serbia believed that corruption is widespread among 
national and local politicians (Sotiropoulos, 2017). Vuković (2017) analyses corruption on 
the local level in Croatia and suggests that the reason why voters do not seem to punish 
corruption can be attributed to the selectorate theory, i.e. adverse effect of small winning 
coalitions on corruption.
29 In comparison to Bulgaria, Czech Republic, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania 
and Slovakia. 
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Figure 8: Grand corruption forms, 2019
Source: Author based on BEEPS 2019. 
Previous studies have found that grand corruption is also detrimental to 
business endeavours in general. Habiyaremye and Raymond (2018) show 
that grand corruption decreases the propensity of firms to conduct re-
search and development and to bring new products and services on the 
market. Thus, it has the possibility to adversely affect potentially the most 
propulsive segment of the economy, thereby reducing long-term growth 
prospects. Although some find that grand corruption has the possibility 
to increase the revenues of a company, thus making it an important ac-
tivity for the management, it is also important to notice that any type of 
corruption acts as a kind of tax, by making demand on the time the firm 
managers spend in dealing with government officials. 
5. Conclusion
The paper addresses corruption varieties in Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia, 
with the main focus on whether the countries have developed specific cor-
ruption patterns unique to their own economic and political environment. 
The analysis relies on the World Bank Enterprise Survey data, thereby be-
ing based on the managers’ perspective on corruption practices. The Sur-
vey enables gaining an important comparative insight into the corruption 
from the business sector perspective. The research presented is focused 
on the differences between petty (corruption practices in an administra-
tive agency or service) and grand corruption (corruption on different lev-
els of government) in the analysed economies. Detecting specific forms 
of corruption in a society provides for better targeting of policy measures.
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The analysis has established that both foreign and domestically owned 
firms did business with the government sector throughout the analysed 
2002–2019 period, putting them into a position to at least observe in-
formal payments. However, towards the end of the period, foreign firms 
refrain from making such statements. Domestic firms, however, report 
similar estimates of approximately 5-8% of the contract value being paid 
to ensure a government contract. The analysis has confirmed that in the 
analysed economies, the government sector is still important even in the 
post-transition period. In dealings with the government sector, the busi-
ness sector seems to frequently encounter corruptive practices. A general 
policy recommendation would be to decrease the role of government to 
the regulatory role and to further support the development of entrepre-
neurship. However, a more specific policy recommendation would be to 
monitor public procurement more closely in all analysed countries. 
The firms which obtain a contract with the government sector perceive 
corruption to be a higher obstacle to their business activity in all the coun-
tries, with the highest difference in Croatia, and the lowest in Serbia. The 
same result is for those who experience petty corruption – they are more 
likely to claim that corruption impedes their business endeavours, again 
with the highest difference in Croatia. Such results imply that additional 
efforts in reducing corruption, although important for all analysed coun-
tries, would probably be most welcomed by the business sector in Croatia. 
However, from this result a general policy recommendation emerges that 
efforts to reduce corruption should be kept in focus, regardless of the po-
tentially low perceived level of corruption. The benefits through increased 
business activity and improved competitiveness are expected to have a 
wider positive economic impact in all three countries.
Although the main forms of corruption seem to differ among the coun-
tries, within each country there does not seem to be any systematic change 
in the forms of corruption. While in Slovenia managers are most likely to 
notice grand corruption, petty corruption seems to be more widespread 
in Croatia and Serbia. In Slovenia and Serbia, respondents seem to recog-
nise a strong corruptive potential of the local government level, while con-
trary to the general perception, managers in Croatia are less likely to point 
to local politicians. This does not imply that the level of grand corruption 
is lower in Croatia, but is probably more related to the fact that Croatia is 
still a highly centralised economy, and the sources of political power and 
influence can be found on the national level. Another interesting finding 
in the case of Croatia is that the managers’ political ties obtained during 
their previous political careers are a strong predictor for engaging in petty 
722





corruption. While breaking political connections might be relatively hard, 
introducing more efficient systems of monitoring public administration 
officials could be a more viable policy option.
From the policy perspective, it is of utmost importance to track the most 
recent forms of petty corruption, so the implementation of anti-corrup-
tion activities can target specific public sector domains. The analysis has 
revealed such domains for the year 2019. In the Croatian and Slovenian 
case, additional efforts are expected in connection with the activities re-
lated to obtaining an operating licence; in case of Serbia, increased efforts 
related to preventing corruption in import licencing. Based on the most 
recent survey results, specific awareness raising campaigns can be organ-
ised through employers’ associations in order to deter future corruptive 
practices in specific public administration areas. 
Limitations of the present study stem from the fact that it relies on the 
quality of the data source used. While there is no doubt that the survey 
has been carried out with the highest standards, the potential strategic 
answering by the respondent can hardly be avoided when it comes to 
such an elusive phenomenon as corruption. Thus, research results should 
not be the only source to determine the direction of policy actions, but 
should complement the regular activities of institutions responsible for 
preventing corruptive activity in each country. This can be particularly 
burdensome as corruption practices are sometimes also deeply rooted in 
the business culture. 
Another disadvantage is that the analysis is restricted to the predeter-
mined set of questions (predominately focused on the firm-government 
relationship), thus potentially disabling a deeper analysis of a specific phe-
nomenon. A possible remedy could be to supplement the results with 
another similar survey that would focus on questions specific to the cor-
ruption practices of the analysed countries. 
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Table A1: Sample size of the BEEPS 
Croatia Serbia Slovenia
2002 187 230 188
2005 236 282 223
2013 360 360 270
2019 404 361 409
Source: Author based on the BEEPS dataset, various waves.
Table A2: Perceived percentage of contract value in the form of informal payment
2002 2005 2013 2019
Croatia
Min 1 0.1 3 5
Max 20 20 15 5
Serbia
Min 0.1 .2 2 1
Max 30 15 8 20
Slovenia
Min 1 0.1 1 15
Max 20 20 20 30
Source: Author based on the BEEPS dataset, various waves.
Table A3: Probability that a firm will engage in petty corruption














































































































































Observations 220 296 146
Pseudo R2 0.335 0.0971 0.183
Log-likelihood -18.32 -66.10 -14.99
Correctly classified 97.73 93.24 97.26
Pearson chi2 102.81 286.7 164.7**
Hosmer-Lemeshow 1.01 7.23 10.37
Source: Author’s estimates based on BEEPS 2019.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
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MANAGERS’ PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION IN CROATIA, 
SERBIA AND SLOVENIA
Summary
The paper provides a comparative analysis of managers’ perception of corruption 
in three post-transition economies based on The World Bank Enterprise Survey 
data in the period 2002-2019. Results suggest that although the main forms 
of corruption seem to differ among the countries, there does not seem to be any 
systemic change within individual countries. While in Slovenia managers are 
most likely to notice grand corruption, petty corruption seems to be more wide-
spread in Croatia and Serbia. Those who perceive corruption to be higher on 
the power ladder are also the ones more likely to consider it an obstacle for their 
business endeavours. The difference is the most significant in Croatia, suggesting 
that additional efforts to reduce corruption would be most readily welcomed by 
the business sector in that country. Limitations of the present study rely on the 
quality of the data source used. While there is no doubt that the survey has been 
carried out with the highest quality standards, the potential strategic answering 
of respondents can hardly be avoided when it comes to such an illusive phenom-
ena as corruption. A possible remedy could be to supplement the results with a 
similar survey that would focus on questions specific to corruption practices of 
the analysed countries. 
Keywords: corruption, managers’ perception, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, com-
parative analysis
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MENADŽERSKA PERCEPCIJA KORUPCIJE U HRVATSKOJ, 
SRBIJI I SLOVENIJI
Sažetak
U radu je provedena usporedna analiza menadžerske percepcije korupcije u 
tri post tranzicijske ekonomije temeljem podataka iz Ankete poduzeća Svjetske 
banke u razdoblju 2002.-2019. Rezultati upućuju na zaključak da unatoč 
tome što se glavni oblici korupcije izgleda razlikuju među promatranim zem-
ljama, unutar svake od njih čini se nema sistemske promjene. Dok u Sloveniji 
menadžeri uglavnom primjećuju veliku korupciju, sitna je korupcija raširena u 
Hrvatskoj i Srbiji. Menadžeri koji imaju snažniju percepciju korupcije su ujed-
no oni koji tendiraju smatrati ju zaprekom njihovim poduzetničkim nastojanji-
ma. Razlika je najveća u Hrvatskoj, što sugerira da bi dodatni napori uloženi 
u smanjenje korupcije vjerojatno bili najviše pozdravljeni od strane hrvatskog 
poslovnog sektora. Ograničenja ovog rada uglavnom leže u kvaliteti korištenih 
podataka. Premda nema dvojbe da je anketa provedena uz poštovanje najboljih 
standarda kvalitete, potencijalno strateško odgovaranje ispitanika nemoguće je 
izbjeći kod istraživanja tako varljivog koncepta kao što je korupcija. Ta bi se 
manjkavost mogla popraviti provedbom slične dodatne ankete koja bi se usre-
dotočila na specifična pitanja o koruptivnoj praksi u analiziranim zemljama. 
Ključne riječi: korupcija, menadžerska percepcija, Hrvatska, Srbija, Slovenija, 
usporedna analiza
